NATO after the Summit in Madrid

On the 20th of October INCIPE held the Seminar NATO after the Summit in Madrid, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defense. The activity featured two round tables. The inauguration was in charge of Manuel Alabart, Ambassador of Spain and General Secretary of INCIPE, and of Admiral (r.) Juan Francisco Martínez, General Secretary of Defense Policy (SEGENPOL) in the Ministry of Defense. The closing conference was given by Carmen Romero, Deputy Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO.

The first round table, The new Madrid Strategic Concept: what has changed?, was moderated by Vicente Garrido, General Director of INCIPE. It was attended by Álvaro Ortega, Deputy Director General for Foreign and Security Policy; Miguel Peco-Yeste, Political Adviser to the Policy Planning Unit, Office of the NATO Secretary General; and Mariola Urrea, Professor of International Law and European Union at the University of La Rioja. The second round table, Implications for Spain of the new Strategic Concept, was moderated by Mar Hidalgo, senior analyst of the IEEE. Adolfo Menéndez Menéndez, President of the Spanish Atlantic Association; Cor. Jose Luis Calvo, Director of the Division of Coordination and Studies of Security and Defense (DICOES) of the Ministry of Defense; and Félix Arteaga, principal researcher in the area of security and international defense of the Elcano Royal Institute. After the respective presentations, both the on-site and online guests were able to ask their questions to the speakers of the two round tables.

SEGENPOL, Admiral Juan Francisco Martínez, began his speech by taking stock of the outcome of the NATO Summit, held in Madrid from 28th to 30th June. He insisted that the Alliance had been strengthened by consolidating its community of values and by the attendance to the Summit of countries from the Asia-Pacific; a geostrategic region of high global importance, and of the EU, with which a new bridge of relations was extended (art. 42 and 43). The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for the Alliance’s reform, already foreseen before the conflict, and which has seen its minimum common multiple consolidated: consensus. They have sought interdependencies in their military capabilities, although not excessive dependencies, increasing investment without damaging resilience. The approval of the new Strategic Concept represents an important and innovative achievement, where Spain has been perfectly portrayed by its attention to human security, 360 degree security (against all threats, in all directions), respect for the allies’ territorial integrity (art. 20) or references specific to Africa. According to the SEGENPOL however, this is not enough, there is an insufficient critical mass to promote the rules of international law, with countries that have not condemned the invasion of Ukraine within the United Nations; and he stresses the need to build bridges with Ibero-America.

The New Strategic Concept of Madrid. What has changed?

During the first round table The new Madrid Strategic Concept: what has changed? Álvaro Ortega applauds the transparency in the positioning of the Atlantic Alliance, and in line with the SEGENPOL, insists that the EU has been given a compass to make it a global player of strategic autonomy. The new Strategic Concept identifies two very clear threats: Russia, as the most important and direct for the first time since the Cold War, and terrorism. He insists that the aggression on Ukraine, as well as the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, has meant a paradigm shift; seeking to replace a security architecture based on trust with one based on guarantees. The reform processes within the Alliance have accelerated, clearly identifying threats in the space, cybernetic and hybrid areas for which, depending on the degree and incursion, Art. 5 and the collective security system can be evoked. Deterrence and defense have taken precedence as the first task of NATO, although not recovering the Forward Defense doctrine of the Cold War and careful not to invoke an escalation in the conflict. Álvaro Ortega points out that NATO isn’t the organization to coordinate the direct military assistance of the Allies to Ukraine, unlike the EU, which sought a message of concentration through the European Peace Support Fund.

Mariola Urrea insists on the need for society to comprehend and support the implications of the new Strategic Concept, in which there is much going back to the roots, but also an important added value. The aggression against Ukraine has produced a challenge in the liberal international order in the terms and rules on which European political life as we have shaped it is viable. The rules of international law have been threatened and even violated, and peace cannot return until it can be preserved. Mariola Urrea claims the EU has overcome its myopia and begins to handle the language of power in leaps and bounds, aware that its policy instruments are not useful enough in the new geopolitical architecture. She concludes that by focusing only on deterrence and defense and neglecting the other two tasks (crisis management and cooperative security), collective security cannot be guaranteed.

Miguel Peco-Yeste closes the first round table defining the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid as the most politically ambitious in the history of the Alliance. As far as China is concerned, NATO remains open to dialogue and constructive engagement (for example in arms control), and does not see the Asian giant as an adversary; but his way of reshaping the world has direct consequences for our democracy. He stresses, like Álvaro Ortega, the opening of new operational areas, such as space and cyberdefense; and emphasizes in this aspect those related to terrorism, recognizing the ability of these individuals not only to conduct attacks but to inspire them. Among the innovative elements as of 2010, the Summit addressed the issue of emerging technologies, altering the character of conflicts. The three pillars mentioned above are reinforced with additional units to become higher level units, while the idea of prevention is introduced within the concept of crisis management.

Implications for Spain of the New Strategic Concept

In the second round table, Colonel José Luis Calvo insists on not extolling the Strategic Concept and instead treating it more like a fixed photo of a given moment that NATO will not follow fully. It discerns the two currents or positions within the Alliance: the hardest, globalist and expansive of the Anglo-Saxon countries; and the most prudent and regional European. The Madrid Summit has brought about a change in atmosphere, recovering the good forms, the spirit of solidarity and the mutual respect among allies, which seemed lost with the presidency of Donald Trump. Interconnectivity, command and control, logistics and public communication, increasingly digitized, will be the key to our defense. It also insists on NATO and the EU as complementary concepts, not competitors, although the latter’s security capabilities are not negligible.

Adolfo Menéndez affirms that the Strategic Concept represents for Spain a commitment, a responsibility and an awareness of our current situation. The country has had a clear dedication to democracy, the rule of law and freedom since 1978. This implies a very clear political, economic and military responsibility, with an attitude consistent with NATO’s strategic concept, which is not detrimental to the Union’s strategic autonomy. The economy has become a tool of combat, marking a direction of increase of around 25% in defense spending, which must be augmented in terms of more structural than conjunctural spending. The professionalization of the Armed Forces in the last 20 years has positioned Spain in a remarkable place in terms of high-level technical preparation. In short, freedom and human rights do not allow room for negotiation in the face of authoritarianism, which, although it does not imply strategic blindness, does indicate a direction.

Félix Arteaga, third member of this thematic block, points out that the war in Ukraine has involved a Copernican turn: the focussing of NATO (formerly operating on various fronts) against a common enemy as part of its Strategic Concept. Thus, although it was believed that the main problem would be to explain to the Spanish society why it is necessary to implement such a determined and strict structure (formerly oriented to crisis management), the February invasion has appeased this concern, opening the debate on operational and capacity issues. The industrial base, logistics and strategic reserves that support the now insufficient Armed Forces must scale to sustainable levels. According to Arteaga, the title awarded to the manner of cooperating is of little importance, because what matters is counting with like-minded, regional partners. Spain must seek them wherever it has strategic interests, at the same time as an understanding and attention to the area of the Sahel begins to penetrate, which Spain has been pursuing for years, and where it must develop its own military posture (missile shield, combat operations, etc.).

Closing remarks

Carmen Romero closed the seminar stressing the need not to take NATO values for granted in the new security scenario, systemic shocks and volatility; not only in the East, but also in the South. The new Strategic Concept drives the strategic adaptation of the Alliance, making it clear that the norms and principles that provided predictability after the Cold War are under siege and pressure. Thus, if in 2003 there was talk of a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and in 2010 of deterrence and dialogue; 2022 presents a scenario where it only seeks to keep open the channels of communication with Moscow to manage risks and avoid escalation. Any change in that relationship is conditional on Russia’s re-signing into international law. NATO is a defensive, not offensive, organization that seeks deterrence, not confrontation, putting an end to the conflict with Ukraine as a sovereign and independent nation and pursuing collective security. Regarding China, Carmen Romero highlights that, although its coercive policies pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, this does not imply that a constructive relationship is not maintained, understanding the opportunities presented by Beijing’s rise. In the area of terrorism, it is highlighted that it continues to be the most direct asymmetric threat to citizen security and reflects the evolution of tactics and capabilities not mentioned in the previous Concept. Climate change is identified as a crisis multiplier, and we begin to talk about a link between our strategic security and that of the Indo-Pacific. In short, security and defense will remain the backbone of the Atlantic Alliance, adapting to a multidimensional understanding with the introduction of the concept of advanced defense and with special attention to innovation.